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Michigan has approximately 11,000 inland lakes and more freshwater shoreline than any other state in the country, so the odds of your municipality having roads that run along or end at a body of water are pretty high. This is why every summer, several municipalities have questions about what activities can occur at public road ends and who is allowed to take part in such activities. The answer to these questions, like many answers in the law is it depends. It depends on several factors, including how the public road was created and what type of water source the road ends at. In this e-letter we discuss these two factors so that you may have a better general understanding of the rights of your residents at different public road ends.

To start, the law surrounding this area has been confused by various decisions of the courts. This is because small facts can greatly impact the analysis and overall outcome of the case. This results in many cases relating to the use of road ends and the scope of activities, but the basis for which those road ends exist varies. These differences can impact the determination of who has access to the water from the road end.

First, there are several different ways a public road can be created. A road may be laid out for the purpose of being a public road or dedicated to the public by statute, common law, or implication. This factor can change the type of title the public holds over the land. As a result, this affects how a court will determine the scope of access at the road end.

Second, the type of waterway at which the road ends at will again alter the analysis the court uses to reach a conclusion. There is a distinction between navigable and non-navigable waterways. Generally, water from lakes and watercourses may be used only by persons with a legal interest in lands bordering those bodies of water, subject to the public’s rights and local regulations, and each person’s use of the water must be reasonable in relation to that of other persons’ use. Hilt v Weber, 233 NW 159 (1930).  Further, inland lakes and the Great Lakes are treated differently and can be subject to inconsistent court application of the applicable standards related to public access through public road ends.

Different Ways a Public Road is Created

“For a road to become public property, there generally must be a statutory dedication and an acceptance on behalf of the public, a common-law dedication and acceptance, or a finding of highway by public user.” Beulah Hoagland Appleton Qualified Pers Residence Trust v Emmet County Rd Comm’n, 600 NW2d 698 (1998). Dedication is a private landowner’s act of giving his or her land to the public for use as a road, while alternatively, laying out is the process by which a public authority, pursuant to statute, establishes a public road.

1. Laying Out of Roads

A public road may be laid out through creation by the state, counties, or local units of government. Article VII, § 16 of the Michigan Constitution provides that the Legislature can provide for laying out roads and for road commissions. Further MCL 224.11 states that “[t]he board of county road commissioners may lay out new roads within the county as they consider necessary.” Under this statute, the road must be at least 66 feet wide, and a public hearing must take place before the road may be laid out.

2. Statutory Dedication

Statutory dedication occurs when a plat (or deed) is filed and then that dedication is accepted. For a valid statutory dedication to take place there must be intent on behalf of the owner, which can be shown by the roads on the plat. Acceptance of the dedication by the road agency can be formal—board acceptance and order of opening, informal—exercising authority over and/or maintaining the road, or presumed—10 years after first recording.

A valid statutory dedication, typically a duly recorded plat, may convey the land underlying the road to the County in fee for the use stated in the plat. MCL 560.253(1). However, this is only a presumption and any of the circumstances surrounding the formation and dedication of the plat will be considered in determining the underlying ownership as well as potential other pertinent facts that could be considered by a Michigan court. Prior to 1967, such a dedication presumed to only convey an easement—meaning that underlying landowners retained title to the land subject to the roadway and use by the public.

Even with the statutory presumption, plat dedication must be considered on a case-by-case basis, looking at the specific language of the plat in question. For example, in Higgins Lake Property Owners Association v Gerrish Township, lakefront property owners sued based on subdivision plats that granted streets and alleys with water access “to the use of the public.” Higgins Lake Property Owners Ass’n v Gerrish Twp, 662 NW2d 387 (2003). Plaintiffs argued that road end water access areas were used for lounging, sunbathing, picnicking, and mooring of boats in the water. The court held that the intent of the plattor, not historical use of the land, controlled permissible activities. It also cited previous opinions where sunbathing and picnicking activities were not considered “directly related to a true riparian use.” The court ultimately held that the erection of boat hoists were not permissible as they were outside the scope of dedication.

This case shows that one must look to the scope of the dedication, as determined by the language of the plat and the intent of the plattor as shown through the plat itself.

3. Common Law Dedication

A common law dedication of a roadway requires three elements: intent of the owner to offer land for a road; acceptance and maintenance by a road agency; and use by the public generally. Unlike statutory dedication, a formal writing is not necessary at common law; the intent is instead determined by the facts and circumstances. DeWitt v Roscommon County Rd Comm’n, 207 NW2d 209 (1973).

The analysis used for a common law dedication is very similar to that of a statutory dedication. Both focus on the intention of the grantor at the time of the road’s dedication. The historical use of the road may not be key, but the passage of time that the road has existed is often relevant. A common law dedication considers all facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged dedication.

4. Highway by User

Highway by user is a term used for an implied dedication to the public, meaning that the public is able to acquire title to a highway despite no valid dedication being made. Like a common law dedication, this creates an easement over the land for use by the public to travel. The statute discussing the methods of creation by highway by user states the following:

All highways regularly established in pursuance of existing laws, all roads that shall have been used as such for 10 years or more, whether any record or other proof exists that they were ever established as highways or not, and all roads which have been or which may hereafter be laid out and not recorded, and which shall have been used 8 years or more, shall be deemed public highways, subject to be altered or discontinued according to the provisions of this act.

MCL 221.20. A highway by use requires that there be a defined line and that the road is traveled and worked upon by public authorities and traveled over and used by the public for 10 consecutive years, without interruption, and the possession thereof by the public authorities must be open, notorious, and exclusive. Pine Bluffs Area Prop Owners Ass’n v Dewitt Landing & Dock Ass’n, 792 NW2d 18 (2010).

If a highway by user is established, the statute raises a rebuttable presumption that the road is 66 feet wide. MCL 221.20. But this width set by statute is not inherent; a property owner may rebut the presumption by taking action that the width of the right-of-way has been restricted. Reid v Grand Traverse Bd of County Rd Comm’rs, 2006 Mich App LEXIS 334 (Feb 9, 2006).

In Benninghoff v Tilton, an action was brought to establish the scope of a prescriptive easement at a road end that went to Lake Michigan. The court found that MCL 221.20 only allows for the public to assert a public right to continue using the road as a public road; it does not allow for other recreational uses. Benninghoff v Tilton, 2009 Mich App LEXIS 2357, at *42-43. However, this does not mean prescriptive rights for additional recreation rights cannot be shown at all. Id. at 43. Any additional prescriptive rights need to be separately proven.

Type of Waterway

The nuances in how roads are created forms the basis for ambiguity regarding activities that can exist at road ends. The Legislature did attempt to put to rest some of these unknowns by codifying MCL 324.30111b in 2012. This statute, in pertinent part, states the following:

(1) A public road end shall not be used for any of the following unless a recorded deed, recorded easement, or other recorded dedication expressly provides otherwise:

(a) Construction, installation, maintenance, or use of boat hoists or boat anchorage devices.

(b) Mooring or docking of a vessel between 12 midnight and sunrise.

(c) Any activity that obstructs ingress to or egress from the inland lake or stream.

(2) A public road end shall not be used for the construction, installation, maintenance, or use of a dock or wharf other than a single seasonal public dock or wharf that is authorized by the local unit of government, subject to any permit required under this part. This subsection does not prohibit any use that is expressly authorized by a recorded deed, recorded easement, or other recorded dedication. This subsection does not permit any use that exceeds the uses authorized by a recorded deed, recorded easement, other recorded dedication, or a court order.

It is important to note, however, that this statute applies specifically to inland lakes.

The applicability of this statute is only one of the differences in analysis between the Great Lakes and inland lakes. There is also a difference when determining the rights of the public to walk along the shore. This is due in large part to the public trust doctrine. This doctrine is based on the idea that certain resources are of such fundamental importance to society that they should be preserved and protected for the use and enjoyment of the public.

In Glass v Goeckel, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the land subject to the public trust extends to the “high water mark” which it defined as where “the presence and action of the water is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other easily recognized characteristic.” Glass v Goeckel, 703 NW2d 58 (2005). The Court took this definition from a Wisconsin case that used evidence like aerial photographs, survey maps, and expert testimony to determine the location of the ordinary high-water mark. Id. at 72.

The Court went on to determine that walking along the lakeshore is inherent in the exercise of traditionally protected public rights of navigation, hunting, and fishing for commerce or pleasure, while simultaneously acknowledging that the public trust doctrine does not permit every use of the lands. Id. at 46. For example, the property rights of the riparian property owner are superior except to the limited rights protected by the public trust doctrine. Id. at 47.

Thus, when it comes to walking along, for example, Lake Michigan, two points can be inferred:

1. Members of the public cannot walk above the ordinary high-water mark without the lakeshore owner’s permission, or else it will constitute a trespass.
2. Although Glass did establish that there was a right to walk along the shoreline, this decision did not grant the public the additional rights to lounge, sunbathe, or have a picnic on the shoreline area without the permission of the lakeshore owner.

In Michigan, when it comes to inland lakes, the owner of riparian land that borders on an inland lake ordinarily owns the land under the water to the middle of the lake. Theis v Howland, 380 NW2d 463 (1985).  As discussed above, this is different from a Great Lake, because in that case riparian owners have only a secondary right to the public to land below the ordinary high-water mark. With inland lakes, the public would still have access to the water, but subject to MCL 324.30111b, and the right to walk along the beach would not exist absent additional facts to the contrary.

Conclusion: Charting a Clear Course for Your Municipality

For Michigan municipalities, understanding public road end rights is not just an academic exercise, it is essential for managing real conflicts that arise every summer between residents, property owners, and the general public. The key takeaway is that context is everything: how your roads were created and what type of waterway they access determines the scope of permissible activities.

Here’s what you should remember:

1. Determine Road Origins. Whether a road was laid out by the government, dedicated by plat, established through common law, or created by long-term public use fundamentally shapes what activities are allowed at its terminus. The creator’s original intent—not decades of community tradition—typically controls what is permitted.
2. Great Lakes vs. Inland Lakes Matter. The 2012 statute (MCL 324.30111b) provides helpful clarity for inland lake road ends by specifically prohibiting boat hoists, overnight mooring, and obstructive activities unless expressly authorized. However, this statute does not apply to Great Lakes access points, where the public trust doctrine creates different—and often broader—public rights.
3. Documentation Is Your Friend. The strongest protection against disputes comes from clear recorded dedications that spell out intended uses. When conflicts arise, courts look first to deeds, plats, and formal dedications rather than long-standing community practices.
4. Practical Considerations. Consider creating an inventory of your municipality’s road ends now, before the next beach season. For each location, identify how the road was created and what your records show about intended uses. Pay attention to whether there are ongoing local disputes or areas of uncertainty that may require legal clarification for ambiguous situations. Additionally, consider developing ordinances that could regulate specific activities causing community impacts, such as seasonal dock installations, overnight mooring, or other uses that may be creating conflicts between residents and property owners.

Michigan’s abundant waterways are both a blessing and a challenge for local governance. By understanding these legal distinctions and preparing accordingly, your municipality can better serve residents while respecting property rights and avoiding costly litigation. When in doubt, consult with your municipal attorney—the investment in clarity far outweighs the cost of summer-long disputes at the water’s edge.

By: Claire Moore

This publication is intended for educational purposes only. This communication highlights specific areas of law and is not legal advice. The reader should consult an attorney to determine how the information applies to any specific situation.