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Throughout 2025, appellate courts at both the state and federal level issued several decisions that will have a notable impact on townships and municipalities across Michigan. Given the large volume of recent zoning-related municipal cases, this E-Letter could not cover them all. Instead, it focuses on five cases that stood out from last year. These decisions address issues ranging from proper inspection procedures to the preemptive effect of the Right to Farm Act and vested rights based on unlawfully issued permits. This E-Letter explores these issues in depth and provides practical takeaways for municipal officials and those interested in zoning to consider for actions moving forward in 2026.

Sixth Circuit Holds Code Enforcement Can Violate the Fourth Amendment

Zoning Ordinance administration requires enforcement. Enforcement regularly includes investigations and general fact-finding regarding whether a potential zoning violation exists. Many zoning administrator and code enforcement officials often wonder whether a warrant is required. In the case of Mockeridge v. Harvey, 149 F.4th 826 (6th Cir. 2025), the Sixth Circuit visited boundaries on how local officials may investigate potential zoning and housing code violations. The Sixth Circuit held that government officials who enter private property without a warrant or consent from the property owner to investigate code compliance may violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches—even when they are merely observing exteriors of structures.

The Mockeridges purchased remote, woodland property in northern Michigan in 2020. They installed five prefabricated 200-square-foot “mini-cabins” approximately 80 feet from an original cabin to serve as sleeping quarters. Each cabin had beds, closets, lofts, electricity, porches, and windows, but no plumbing.

In June 2021, three local government officials entered the property without a warrant or consent after receiving complaints from neighbors about the Mockeridges potentially operating a public campground. The officials entered through the woods of an adjacent property, inspected the cabins and surrounding areas, and even looked through the windows. The cabins were unoccupied at the time. One official noted that a mini-cabin appeared to violate the Township’s setback requirements and measured setback distances.

The Sixth Circuit focused its analysis on whether this conduct constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Under the property-based approach recently reemphasized by the Supreme Court in cases like Florida v. Jardines and Collins v. Virginia, a search occurs when the government physically intrudes on a house or its curtilage to conduct a search for purposes of a potential violation of local ordinance and obtains information regarding that search. Curtilage is defined as the area immediately surrounding a home, including the yard, grounds, and outbuilding. The court found that the mini-cabins qualified as “houses”. The court further determined that officials were on the curtilage given the circumstances of coming within a few feet of these homes in a secluded area.

Because officials gathered information regarding whether violations existed for local housing, zoning, and sanitation regulations during this intrusion, it was a search. The court emphasized that this situation differs from a tax assessor viewing property, as the Sixth Circuit had previously considered acceptable in Widgren v. Maple Grove Twp., 429 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2005), as there was no physical intrusion or touching of the house or surrounding area.

The search was also unreasonable because warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, and no exception applied. The interest of officials in identifying potential housing-code violations was “minimal compared to the significant intrusion on the property rights” of the Mockeridges. The court stated that “the right to be free from a warrantless code-compliance search with no alternative pre-compliance review was clearly established.” See Gardner v. Evans, 920 F.3d 1038 (6th Cir. 2019).

There are several takeaways from this decision:

1. Municipalities should review their code enforcement inspection procedures. Officials should consider whether to amend such procedures to not enter private property—including through adjacent properties—to investigate zoning or code complaints without either obtaining consent, a warrant, or conducting observations only from public rights-of-way.
2. The code enforcement officers should be particularly suspect and consider a warrant when entering to conduct a search of curtilage of a “home”. Municipalities should consult with their attorneys about what inspections can be lawfully conducted and under what circumstances.
3. Municipalities should consider implementing administrative inspection warrant procedures and identify the Michigan forms for situations where consent is not obtained.
4. Administrative search warrants always provide constitutional protections for necessary inspections.

Michigan Court of Appeals Confirms Right to Farm Act Can Preempt Local Zoning—Even When Farming Began After Ordinance Enactment

The Michigan Court of Appeals heard a case regarding the effectiveness of the Michigan Right to Farm Act (“RTFA”) in relation to local zoning ordinances. Township of Fraser v. Haney (Case No. 368834 (July 9, 2025)). There, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that even if farming operations began after the RTFA was amended in 2000, RTFA can still preempt local zoning ordinances. The time when the ordinance was in effect is irrelevant.

The plaintiff purchased property in 1986 that was zoned commercial; raising livestock was not an allowed use under the Township’s Zoning Ordinance. Regardless, the plaintiff began raising deer and elk in 1989, allegedly based on verbal approval from the Township Supervisor. In 2006, the plaintiff started raising pigs on the property. The Township claimed it first became aware of pigs on the property in 2016, after which it promptly filed a nuisance abatement action.

The trial court held plaintiff’s pig operation violated the Township’s zoning ordinance and granted an injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that the RTFA provides plaintiff with a potential defense to continue his pig operation.

Under MCL 286.471 et seq., the RTFA establishes circumstances where a farm and its operation may not be deemed a public or private nuisance. The RTFA provides this protection as an affirmative defense if a defendant can prove two conditions: (1) the activity or condition challenged is a farm or farm operation; and (2) the farm or farm operation conforms to the generally accepted agricultural and management practices (“GAAMPs”).

The Township argued that the 2000 RTFA amendment could not apply because plaintiff’s zoning violations predated it. The court disagreed. While the 2000 amendment cannot apply retroactively under Travis v. Preston, 249 Mich. App. 338 (2002), this fact did not matter here because plaintiff began his pig farming after the 2000 amendment, and the Township was seeking prospective injunctive relief. As a result, the court remanded to the trial court to determine whether plaintiff’s pig operation conforms to GAAMPs.

The court also addressed two equitable defenses. First, laches did not bar the Township’s action because the Township discovered the pigs in 2016 and promptly filed suit. While the state had previously sent a letter about “wild boars,” the court noted that the complaint related to domestic hogs—therefore, no unreasonable delay existed.

Second, the Township was not equitably estopped from seeking an injunction based on the previous “permission” allegedly granted by the Township Supervisor. The court emphasized that “townships are not estopped from enforcing their ordinance absent exceptional circumstances”. Such exceptional circumstances do not include “casual private advice from township officials”. The court also noted that mere failure to enforce an ordinance is insufficient to give rise to equitable estoppel. See Charter Township of Lyon v. Petty, 317 Mich. App. 382 (2016).

The practical takeaways from this case are significant:

1. The RTFA can preempt local zoning ordinances for farming operations that comply with GAAMPs—regardless of when the zoning ordinance was enacted.
2. Casual conversations between township officials and property owners do not constitute the type of “official permission” that could support equitable estoppel. However, municipalities should train officials to avoid making any representations about zoning compliance that could be misconstrued.
3. Mere delay in enforcement does not create laches or estoppel—but municipalities should still act promptly upon discovering violations to avoid factual disputes about when knowledge arose.

Unlawfully Issued Permits Do Not Create Vested Rights

In Hart v. Township of Presque Isle (Case No. 24-2124 (Sept. 8, 2025)), the Sixth Circuit addressed when a building permit creates a vested property right sufficient to support procedural due process and takings claims. The court held that permits issued in violation of zoning ordinances do not create vested rights—even when the property owner relies on the permit and completes substantial construction.

The Harts purchased lakefront property in Presque Isle Township. They applied for a permit to construct a 2,500-square-foot home. The Township’s zoning ordinance required specific detailed plans drawn to scale for every permit application. The Harts attached a drawing to their application, but the drawing lacked required details. Despite these deficiencies, the Township Zoning Administrator issued the permit.

The Harts then proceeded to bring truckloads of fill dirt and raised the lot above the ordinance maximum height. They also brought rocks to extend their lakefront footage and installed a pier, changing the shoreline. Neighbors escalated the matter to the Township, and the Zoning Administrator issued a stop-work order without providing the Harts prior notice or a hearing.

A hearing was held before the Zoning Board of Appeals, which revoked the Harts’ permit because it lacked the required scaled drawings. The Harts obtained a new permit with proper drawings and completed construction but experienced a 70-day delay and their original builder abandoned the project.

The Harts sued under § 1983, alleging: (1) deprivation of procedural due process because the stop-work order issued without prior notice or hearing; and (2) a Fifth Amendment temporary taking for the duration of the stop-work order. The Sixth Circuit found in favor of the Township, holding that the Harts had no vested property right because their permit was issued in violation of zoning ordinances requiring scaled drawings.

While the existence of a permit is an important factor in procuring a vested right, the permit must be lawful. The court discussed the proposition that permits issued in violation of existing laws do not establish vested rights, even when relied upon. The Harts argued that the Township should be estopped from enforcing zoning ordinances based on equity and good conscience when the land is permanently deprived of value. The court rejected this notion, however, as the Harts still had beneficial use for the property and now enjoy full use of their house despite additional cost and inconvenience.

Without a protected property interest, the Harts’ procedural due process claim necessarily failed. Similarly, the Harts’ Fifth Amendment takings claim could not proceed. The court explained that a use for a particular purpose is not a “taking” if the right never existed in the first place.

Several interesting takeaways emerge from this case:

1. Municipalities should ensure zoning administrators carefully review permit applications for compliance with all ordinance requirements before issuing permits. While the Township prevailed, the litigation could have been avoided entirely with proper initial review.
2. Stop-work orders could still be accompanied with post-deprivation hearings to address any concerns a property may have who claims to have a vested property right.

Rezoning vs. Amendment Notice Requirements

The Michigan Court of Appeals also addressed whether amending a zoning ordinance to add permitted special uses within an existing zoning classification constitutes rezoning that triggers personal mailed notice requirements under the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA). Montrief v. Macon Township Board of Trustees (Case No. 368603 (October 6, 2025)).

Plaintiffs were landowners in the Township. In 2017, the Township Board amended its zoning ordinance to facilitate installation of an industrial-scale solar panel facility occupying over 2,700 acres. A solar developer eventually submitted a special land use permit application, which the Planning Commission recommended for denial. However, the Township Board approved it in 2020.

Plaintiffs challenged the Board’s decision, arguing that the ordinance was invalid because it violated notice provisions in the MZEA and Township zoning ordinances. They contended that personal mailed notice was required because the amendments constituted rezoning.

The question turned on whether this action by the Township was considered “rezoning” under the MZEA, which requires different notice for rezoning than for ordinary amendments. The Board did not change the zoning classification of the land itself but did amend the Township zoning ordinance to change what special uses were permitted within the current classifications—providing notice only by publication.

The Court of Appeals found in favor of the Township. The court noted that “rezoning” is undefined in the MZEA, but based on statutory interpretation, the court determined that rezoning means “reclassifying property as belonging to a different zone or being subject to different restrictions.” The court concluded that the Board did not fail to comply with the MZEA notice provision because personal notice was not required; this was not rezoning, as there was no reclassification of specific properties to a new zoning classification. The Township merely amended its ordinance to add a new special use category that would be available across the applicable zoning district.

Takeaways from this case include the following:

1. Municipalities should understand the distinction between “rezoning” (which requires personal mailed notice) and “amending” a zoning ordinance (which typically requires only publication notice). Rezoning involves reclassifying specific properties to a different zoning district; amending involves changing what uses are permitted within existing districts.
2. When drafting ordinance amendments, municipalities should clearly articulate whether the action constitutes a district-wide text amendment or a site-specific rezoning—this will determine the appropriate notice procedures.

Legislative Rezoning Decisions Remain Presumptively Valid—Challengers Face High Bar

Consistent with the determining rezonings, these municipal board actions, themselves, are provided significant deference. The Michigan Court of Appeals reaffirmed that legislative rezoning decisions are presumptively valid and that challengers bear a heavy burden to overcome this presumption. (Adkison-Hoyt v. Superior Charter Township, Case No. 369764 (April 8, 2025)).

Plaintiffs owned land in Superior Charter Township. A buyer sought to purchase the property adjacent to Plaintiffs’ properties in order to build a managed residential center to assist young adults with mental health struggles. Such a project required rezoning from an agricultural district to planned community zoning. The buyer requested the rezoning, and Plaintiffs campaigned against it. In July 2023, the Township Board voted to approve the rezoning over Plaintiffs’ objections.

Plaintiffs subsequently sued the Township, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs argued the rezoning was inconsistent with the Township Master Plan—that dormitories, offices, and services were incompatible with the area’s current designation for rural, low-density residential, and agricultural uses. They also raised concerns about impacts on nearby wetlands. Finally, Plaintiffs alleged their substantive due process rights were violated.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Township. The court emphasized that zoning is a legislative act. Such acts are presumed reasonable unless the challenger shows that there is no reasonable governmental interest advanced by the zoning ordinance. Here, Plaintiffs failed to show the rezoning was arbitrary or unreasonable. The court found that the Planning Commission’s findings supported the rezoning decision and followed the Township’s zoning ordinance. Critically, the court emphasized that courts “must give great deference to . . . the zoning board’s findings.” (quoting Edward C. Levy Co. v. Marine City Zoning Board of Appeals, 293 Mich. App. 333, 340 (2011)). Plaintiffs did not present evidence to refute the Planning Commission’s findings—merely expressing a “difference in opinion.”

This case provides important pointers on rezonings that affirms the deference courts give to a Township’s legislative decisions: Municipalities should take comfort that properly supported rezoning decisions will be upheld. These decisions are further supported by planning commission findings consistent with the legislative decisions by Townships.

Conclusion

These 2025 zoning decisions demonstrate the continued evolution of land use law in Michigan. From constitutional limits on code enforcement inspections to the proper notice requirements for zoning amendments, courts continue to refine the rules governing how municipalities regulate land use.

These cases underscore several important principles for municipal officials and staff: (1) code enforcement inspections should either obtain consent, a warrant, or observations limited to public rights-of-way, as warrantless entry onto curtilage can violate the Fourth Amendment; (2) the Right to Farm Act continues to preempt local zoning for compliant farm operations, and casual conversations with officials do not create estoppel; (3) permits issued in violation of zoning ordinances do not create vested property rights; (4) amending a zoning ordinance to add special uses is not “rezoning,” and, thus, does not require personal mailed notice; and (5) legislative rezoning decisions are presumptively valid and challengers face a high burden.

It is important to stay up to date on recent developments in Michigan law and consider how those changes may impact your zoning processes, decisions and ordinances in your municipality.

By Christopher S. Patterson and Joseph T. Greene

This publication is intended for educational purposes only. This communication highlights specific areas of law and is not legal advice. The reader should consult an attorney to determine how the information applies to any specific situation.